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PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Defendant, appellant, and cross-appellee Bank of Utah 
(hereinafter Bank), pursuant to Rule 35, U.R.A.P., petitions the 
court for rehearing of its decision filed September 4, 1992, in 
the above-referenced matter on the grounds that the court 
overlooked or misapprehended the following points of law or fact: 
1. The fundamental legal issue in this case was whether 
plaintiff, appellee and cross-appellant Ivan J. Heslop 
(hereinafter Heslop) was constructively discharged by the Bank. 
Even assuming the Bank requested Heslop1s resignation, there was 
insufficient evidence, as a matter of law, to support the jury!s 
verdict that Heslop was constructively discharged. The court 
failed to address this fundamental issue. 
2. Heslop1s evidence of constructive discharge "is 
inherently contradictory or incredible", and therefore fails to 
meet the requirement that the jury's verdict of constructive 
discharge be supported by substantial evidence. 
3. The case should be remanded for a new trial on all 
issues because the facts and issues with respect to the Court!s 
remand for new trial on Heslop1s tort public policy claim are so 
intertwined with the facts and issues related to the constructive 
discharge and implied-in-fact contract claims that they cannot 
adequately be separated. In order to b£ fair to both parties, a 
new trial should be held on all issues. 
1 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT, AS A MATTER OF 
LAW, TO ESTABLISH CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE. 
The central issue in this case was whether Heslop "quit" or 
whether he was constructively discharged, as shown by the first 
question of the Special Verdict inquiring whether Heslop 
voluntarily quit his job. (Record on Appeal, hereinafter R., 
644.) Jury Instructions 15 and 16 further show that the case was 
one of constructive discharge, not express termination. (R. 619, 
620) Notwithstanding that constructive discharge was the basic 
and overriding issue in the case, the legal requirements for a 
constructive discharge are never discussed nor so much as 
mentioned in the Court's opinion. 
The Court's apparent rationale for disregarding this 
specific issue was Heslopfs testimony that the Bank asked for his 
resignation. With respect to the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the jury's verdict, the Court stated: 
The Bank also ignores the crucial testimony 
of Heslop that he was asked to resign and the 
letter he presented that tends to support his 
testimony. [emphasis added] 
The Bank did not ignore this testimony. Instead, it argued 
two basic points: First, that even assuming a demand for 
Heslop1s resignation, the evidence was insufficient, as a matter 
of law, to constitute a constructive discharge; and, second, that 
the evidence was insufficient, as a matter of law, to support a 
2 
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finding that Heslop was asked to resign by the Bank. 
The Court's opinion recognizes that either of these points 
can be a basis for finding the evidence was insufficient to 
support the jury's verdict. The court stated: 
Absent a legal argument that Heslop1s 
evidence fails to support a crucial element 
of his claims or that his evidence is 
inherently contradictory or incredible, we 
will not invade the province of jurors to 
determine Heslop1s credibility or to reverse 
their decision. [Emphasis added] 
Therefore, if there is a legal argument that Heslop1s 
evidence does not support a crucial element of his claim, or if 
his evidence is inherently contradictory or incredible, the Court 
should reverse the jury!s decision. The Bank respectfully 
submits that the Court misapprehended both the law and crucial 
facts related to the constructive discharge issue which, if 
thoroughly addressed, would result in a finding, as a matter of 
law, that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's 
verdict on that point. 
1. A Request for Resignation is Insufficient to Constitute 
Constructive Discharge. 
Assuming the facts most favorable to Heslop, he was asked to 
resign approximately five days after his lending authority was 
revoked. According to Heslop's testimony, which was accepted by 
the jury, the trial court on motion for JNOV or new trial, and 
now by the Supreme Court on appeal, this request for resignation 
was made in light of the following facts and circumstances: 
First, Heslop had an employment contract with the Bank terminable 
3 
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only for good cause. Specifically, Heslop testified he was 
expressly informed in 1962 that the Bank would terminate him only 
for good cause. Second, at the time Heslop resigned, the Bank 
did not have good cause to terminate him. 
Heslop has steadfastly asserted the two above-stated 
positions both before and throughout this litigation. Since he 
believed he could only be terminated for cause and further, that 
the Bank had no good cause, Heslop therefore knew he could not be 
required to resign. Yet he nonetheless submitted his written 
resignation. 
As a matter of law, this is a voluntary resignation and not 
a constructive discharge. The Bank cited cases in support of 
this position, which are not mentioned or discussed anywhere in 
the Court's opinion. In Knee v. School Dist. No. 139, in Canyon 
Cty, 106 Idaho 152, 676 P.2d 727 (1984) the Idaho Court of 
Appeals addressed this very issue. It held that an employee who 
had a contract terminable only for cause was not constructively 
discharged despite his resignation upon demand by his employer 
but without any showing of cause. 
The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of 
plaintifffs constructive discharge case and held that a prudent 
person in plaintiff's position "could not have believed he had 
been terminated" even though the school board demanded his 
resignation and refused to give him even one night to think about 
4 
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Heslop has previously argued that Knee is distinguishable 
because the employee was a school superintendent who had a 
written contract. The Bank submits that is a distinction without 
a difference. The critical principle in Knee was that the 
employee had a contract terminable only for cause and the 
employer gave no cause for the demanded resignation. By Heslop1s 
own testimony, those same factors were present in the instant 
case. The Idaho Court of Appeals stated: 
. . . It is not appropriate to apply the 
doctrine of constructive discharge absent 
facts showing harassment, intimidation, 
coercion or other aggravating conduct on the 
part of the employer which renders working 
conditions intolerable. . . . A mere request 
to resign, without more, is not sufficient to 
warrant a finding of constructive discharge. 
676 P.2d at 730. Likewise, in Christie v. San Miguel Cty. 
School Dist.,759 P.2d 779 (Colo. App. 1988), the Colorado 
appellate court affirmed the trial court's granting of a directed 
verdict in favor of the defendant employer, finding no 
constructive discharge, as a matter of law, even though the 
plaintiff employee was first demoted and later expressly 
requested to resign. The court stated: 
A request for a resignation will not 
support a claim of constructive discharge 
unless accompanied by harassment, coercion, 
or other employer conduct which makes the 
working conditions intolerable. 
759 P.2d at 783. In Wilson v. Bd. of Cty. Comfrs. of Cty. 
of Adams, 703 P.2d 1257 (Colo. 1985) the Colorado Supreme Court 
reversed a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff employee and 
5 
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held, as a matter of law, that the evidence was insufficient to 
support a finding of constructive discharge even though plaintiff 
was specifically told she would be terminated if she did not 
return to work by a date certain and accept primary 
responsibility as "back-up" receptionist, a change in assignment 
which had resulted in plaintiff's initial leaving her job. 
In an analogous case, Wilkinson v. Trust Co. of Georgia 
Assoc,, 128 Ga. App. 473, 197 S.E.2d 146 (1973), the plaintiff 
employee resigned after taking "a two months1 leave of absence 
with pay, in order to think about his employment situation." 197 
S.E.2d at 148. The court stated: 
Even if it is shown that the plaintiff 
resigned under pressure at his employer's 
request, this did not amount to a discharge. 
197 S.E.2d at 148. See also Dusanek v. Hannon, 677 F.2d 538 
(7th Cir. 1982) where the court indicated "that a resignation [by 
a tenured public employee entitled to constitutional rights of 
due process] resulting from a choice between resigning or facing 
proceedings for dismissal is not tantamount to discharge by 
coercion without procedural review if the employee is given 
sufficient time and opportunity for deliberation of the choice 
posed. jCd. at 543. The court reversed the jury's verdict in 
favor of the employee. This Court's opinion affirming the jury's 
verdict in favor of Heslop on the constructive discharge issue is 
grounded on the proposition that a request for resignation, is 
sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. The Bank 
6 
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respectfully submits this is a misapprehension of the law as 
indicated by the cases cited above and requests rehearing for the 
Court to specifically address the issue that a request for 
resignation is not sufficient, as a matter of law, to establish 
constructive discharge in this case. 
2. Heslop's Evidence that He was Asked to Resign is 
Inherently Contradictory or Incredible. 
Heslop was the only witness who testified that he was asked 
to resign by the Bank. Although Heslop called several witnesses 
who had been employees at the Bank at the same time he resigned, 
not one of them corroborated his testimony that the Bank demanded 
his resignation. Most of those witnesses were no longer employed 
at the Bank at the time of the trial. Although the Bank 
recognizes a jury is entitled to believe one witness as opposed 
to several others, it respectfully submits that Heslop1s evidence 
that he was asked to resign is inherently contradictory or 
incredible for several reasons. For example, Heslop initiated 
this action by filing a 12 page complaint dated June 2, 1987, 
nearly four years after he resigned. (R. 1-12) There are five 
pages of detailed factual allegations contained in the complaint. 
With respect to Heslop1s resignation, the allegations in the 
complaint directly contradict his testimony that the Bank 
demanded his resignation. Paragraphs 20 and 21 of the complaint 
state: 
20. In August or September, 1983, a loan 
made by Plaintiff to a Dr. Clayton Gabbert 
was called into question by Timmons. 
7 
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Although not standard practice, an extensive 
list of questions regarding the loan was 
delivered to Plaintiff. Plaintiff was 
accused of making an agricultural loan in 
violation of bank Policy against such loans. 
The loan, although made to a medical doctor 
for an investment, was secured by cattle. 
Even though the Officer1s Loan Committee 
approved the loan, Timmons deemed it an 
agricultural loan because cattle were used as 
security and subsequently terminated 
Plaintiff1s lending authority altogether. 
Timmons1 accusations against Plaintiff were 
merely a pretext for forcing Plaintiff's 
resignation. 
21. Without lending authority and the 
ability to authorize agricultural loans, 
Plaintiff was unable to function in his job 
at the bank. In October, Plaintiff 
petitioned the Board of Directors for a 
chance to argue his position that Timmons1 
policy and order should be rescinded. 
Plaintiff explained that he was being 
unfairly disciplined and would be forced to 
resign without such a recision. Plaintiff 
was subsequently informed that his 
resignation had been accepted, and that the 
Directors wished to receive it in writing. 
Plaintiff was given an opportunity to argue 
his position before the Board, but the result 
was a foregone conclusion. The Directors 
listened to his argument, but asked no 
questions. Plaintiff's official date of 
termination was October 18, 1983, the date to 
which he was paid, although he was asked to 
leave the bank October 5, 1983. [emphasis 
added] 
One looks in vain for an allegation that the Bank demanded 
Heslop's resignation. It is not there. In fact, just the 
opposite is alleged. Heslop states that he told the Board he 
would be forced to resign because he considered the suspension o 
his lending authority to be unfair discipline which made him 
unable to function in his job. This is inherently contradictory 
8 
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with his testimony at trial and therefore makes it incredible. 
The allegations in paragraph 21, however, do support the 
testimony of Ed Kleyn at trial, which was that he told Heslop 
whatever he decided to do, it should be put in writing. 
(Transcript 775-76, 1475) 
A careful reading of Heslop1s letter of resignation also 
shows it is inherently contradictory with his testimony that the 
Bank demanded his resignation. The letter states: 
At your request I am submitting in 
writing my notice of resignation from the 
Bank of Utah to be effective Oct. 18, 1983. 
I find the restriction of Mr. Timmons of not 
allowing me any lending authority and the 
bank unwilling to grant agricultural purpose 
loans to be unbearable. 
The October 18th date allows the Board of 
Directors sufficient time to rescind Mr. 
Timmons1 directive and to negotiate with me 
should they desire to do so. [emphasis 
added] [Exh. 21P] 
Heslop clearly ties his resignation to the suspension of his 
lending authority and the Bank's unwillingness to grant 
agricultural loans, not to a demand for his resignation. The 
fact Heslop states he is allowing the Board time to rescind 
Timmons1 directive (the suspension of his lending authority) and 
to negotiate with Heslop directly is clearly inconsistent with 
testimony that the Bank demanded his resignation. These inherent 
contradictions make his evidence incredible. 
Further evidence shows the inherent contradiction in 
Heslop1s testimony that his resignation was demanded. Heslop 
9 
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prepared notes from which he read when he spoke to the Board of 
Directors on October 6, 1983, at least two days after Ed Kleyn 
allegedly called Heslop and told him the Bank wanted his 
resignation. [Exh. 22P] Nowhere in these notes does Heslop 
state that his resignation was demanded by the Bank. Moreover, 
contrary to the Court's statement in its opinion that Heslop told 
the Board "he would continue employment with the Bank so long as 
he received a reasonable assignment", Heslopfs own notes state: 
"My resignation is effective 10/18 unless you terminate my 
employment beforehand. . . . I am available for assignment from 
you within reason until October 18th should you wish." 
The lack of any independent corroboration of Heslop!s 
testimony also makes it inherently incredible. Heslop1s own 
witnesses included Ed Kleyn, Gerald West, and Boyd Carlsen. Each 
of these individuals were directly involved with the Gabbert 
loan, which precipitated the suspension of Heslop1s lending 
authority. Yet not one of them testified that the Bank demanded 
Heslop1s resignation. Kleyn testified to the exact opposite. 
Heslop also called Gerald Peacock, the Bank's former internal 
auditor, and James Packer, a former officer and director, as 
witnesses. They also did not corroborate Heslop1s testimony that 
the Bank demanded his resignation. None of these people were 
employed at the Bank at the time of trial. Three of them (West, 
Carlsen, and Peacock) testified that the Bank either expressly 
fired them or forced them out. They certainly had no interest in 
10 
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protecting the Bank. It is incredible that in an organization 
the size of the Bank, Heslop could not find even one person who 
had so much as heard that the Bank demanded his resignation in 
October 1983. 
Heslopfs evidence that he was asked to resign "is inherently 
contradictory or incredible", and this Court should so hold and 
should reject that evidence as a basis to sustain the jury's 
verdict. Without that evidence, there is insufficient remaining 
evidence, as a matter of law, to affirm the jury's verdict of 
constructive discharge. 
POINT II 
IF A NEW TRIAL IS TO BE HELD, IT SHOULD 
ENCOMPASS ALL ISSUES, AND NOT JUST THE PUBLIC 
POLICY AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGE ISSUES. 
Where the issues at trial are inseparably intermingled or 
intertwined, so that remanding for a new trial on only part of 
those issues would be unfair to the parties, the court should 
order a new trial on all issues. See Hyland v. St. Mark's 
Hospital, 19 U.2d 134, 427 P.2d 736 (1967). 
In the employment context, this issue arose in Boulder 
Valley School Dist. R-2 v. Price, 805 P.2d 1085 (Colo. 1991), 
where the jury returned a verdict that Price was constructively 
discharged. The trial court granted defendants1 motion for JNOV. 
The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the entry of JNOV, 
modified the damage award so that defendants were jointly and 
11 
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severally liable, and remanded for a new trial on the issue of 
punitive damages. 
On further appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the 
Court of Appeal's reversal of the granting of JNOV, i.e., the 
Supreme Court affirmed the jury's verdict that Price was 
constructively discharged. However, the Supreme Court reversed 
the Court of Appeal's modification of the judgment regarding 
joint and several liability and also reversed the court's holding 
that the burden of proof for punitive damages was by a 
"preponderance of the evidence." 
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's affirmance of the jury's 
finding of constructive discharge, it ordered a new trial on all 
issues. It stated that "[t]he issues of liability and damages in 
this case are so intertwined that the proper resolution is to 
have a new trial on all the issues. Id. at 1094. 
In Hyland v. St. Mark's Hospital, supra, the trial court 
granted JNOV for the plaintiff on the issue of liability and 
ordered a new trial solely on the issue of damages. Although the 
Supreme Court affirmed the granting of a new trial, it held that 
it should be on all issues, not just damages. The court stated: 
Notwithstanding the fact that the trial 
court's ruling does not impress us as wholly 
unreasonable, out of a desire to be fair to 
both sides, we believe that justice would 
best be served by removing any restriction on 
it. . . . The questions relating to the 
plaintiff's injury, how it happened, who was 
at fault, and the pain and injury occasioned 
thereby, are so intermingled that if there is 
to be a new trial, in fairness to both 
parties it should be on all issues. 
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427 P.2d 738. (emphasis added) In the instant case, the 
Court has ordered a new trial on the claim that Heslop was 
terminated in violation of public policy and on the issue of 
consequential damages, including attorney's fees. In order to 
try the public policy claim, essentially all of the same evidence 
that was presented in the first trial will need to be presented 
again. All of the background information on Heslop1s employment 
with the Bank, the positions he held, the hiring of Timmons, the 
reorganization of the Bank, the Gabbert loan, will all have to be 
presented again. These are the same facts submitted to establish 
a constructive discharge, an implied in fact contract, and the 
question of whether there was good cause to terminate. They 
would also obviously have a bearing on the issue of damages, if 
any, and specifically questions about punitive damages. Since 
all these facts and issues are intermingled and interwoven, the 
Bank respectfully submits that in order to be fair to both sides, 
the Court should require a retrial of all issues, not just the 
ones identified in the Court's opinion. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Bank respectfully 
requests that the court grant its petition for rehearing. 
Counsel for the Bank certifies that this petition is presented in 
good faith and not for delay. 
DATED this / / day of September, 1992. 
STRONG/OlANNI 
Glenn C. Hanni 
Stuart H. Schultz 
Attorneys for Bank of Utah 
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